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Abstract
In recent times, the concept of corporate governance has become a topical 
 interest to both academia and industry, the focus of attraction has mostly been on 
the need to understand its potency in advancing a corporation’s ultimate interest, 
and hence the necessity for this study. This study aims to examine corporate gover-
nance. The study utilized a narrative literature review methodology to examine the 
concept of corporate governance, essence of corporate governance, scope of corpo-
rate governance, principles of corporate governance, internal corporate governance 
controls, external corporate governance controls, merit of corporate governance, 
and stewardship theory perspective to corporate governance. The study finally 
made postulations on the prospect of corporate governance.
Keywords: corporate governance, stewardship theory, sustainability
1. Introduction
The evolving of the concept of corporate governance started from the Greek 
term “kyberman” which denotes to guide, steer or govern; from which it transcends 
to a Latin concept “gubernare,” and “governer” from a French perspective. It gener-
ally portrays the decision-making processes and execution strategies; nonetheless it 
connotation could change with regards to the peculiarity of an organization [1].
Cadbury [2] defines corporate governance (CG) as a structure by which 
organizations are controlled and directed, Obodo [3] posits that CG involves the 
balance of power with which the organization is directed, managed, supervised 
and held accountable. CG, to an extent, is a tool through which outside investors 
secure themselves against expropriations by the insiders and management [4]. 
Another competing definition is that CG is an interplay of the relationship between 
company management, shareholders, board, and auditors, etc. [5]; hence, it is 
ultimately about regimes of accountability [6]. The basis of CG does not end at how 
organizations are directed and managed but includes how to ensure and promote 
accountability and responsibility to all stakeholders; therefore, CG will always be in 
existence as long as the corporate structure is undermined, and the managers and 
investors experience conflict [7].
Ngozi and Raymond [8] posit that CG is perceived as having significant implica-
tions for the growth prospects of an economy, because best CG practice reduces 
risks for investors, attracts investment capital and improves the performance of 
organizations [9]. Effective CG is critical to securing corporate accountability, 
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advancing the reliability and validity of financial information, and ensuring 
the efficiency and integrity of capital markets, with a positive effect on investor 
confidence [10].
CG in Nigeria is influenced by both internal and external factors comprising of 
various institutions and individuals charged with the responsibility to ensure effec-
tive management, control and accountability of public organizations [11]. The evo-
lution and principles of the CG system in Nigeria were covered by the Companies 
and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) and improved further in the various Codes of 
Corporate Governance, the CG situation in Nigeria does not represent a complete 
lack or absence of structures, legislations and regulations rather, the ineffectiveness 
of the legislations and structures to effectively ensure compliance and enforcement 
[3]. CG can be identified through acceptable principles which consist of guidelines 
for decision-makers to enable them competently manage the economic and human 
resources in an open, accountable, transparent and lawful manner [12].
In recent times, unpleasant realities in the business world have questioned 
the credibility of CG. These unpleasant realities, as evidenced by the collapse of 
the stock market, uncovering of flagrant abuse of regulations practices, and high 
incidence of corruption in the economy [13]. Oyebode [14] posits that the massive 
fraud “cooking” of books in organizations not to mention insider dealings and 
compromised boards in many organizations, as well as spineless shareholders’ 
associations’, committees for audit and ineffective Annual General Meetings, imply 
the collapse of CG, and the necessity for a viable CG. Theses unpleasant realities 
were addressed via CG decisions (i.e. consolidation, mergers and acquisition, etc.) 
[15], the efficacy of the CG system in limiting these realities [16], have heightened 
the interest in understanding CG, and this the study aims to accomplish.
The remaining section of this paper will be divided into the following heading; 
methodology, concept of CG, essence of CG, scope of CG, principles of CG, inter-
nal CG controls, external CG controls, merit of CG, stewardship theory perspective 
to CG, and conclusion and prospect of CG.
2. Methodology
The narrative literature review methodology was utilized for this study. Its ratio-
nale is anchored on the significant scientific role it plays; as it is a critical element 
of most theses, empirical articles, book chapters, and grant proposals. It engages 
concepts in a much broader and abstract manner, and is most ideal when aligning 
diverse author’s inputs, either for the objective of interconnection or reinterpreta-
tion [17]; it aids in understanding the body of knowledge on a specific concept, 
which offers valuable integration and overviews [18].
3. Concept of corporate governance
CG reveals the allotment of responsibilities and rights among diverse policy-
makers in an organization (i.e. shareholders, managers, board members, etc.) and 
outlines the values, operation modes, and norms for making and executing decisions 
on the affairs of the organization [5]. CG also connotes the structure of norms, pro-
cesses, systems and relationship through which authority is activated and engaged to 
optimally achieve the goals and objectives while monitoring performance and com-
pliance in the organization [5]. Cochran and Warwick [19] define CG as an encom-
passing term that addresses particular issues resulting from interactions among 
management, shareholders, board directors and other corporate stakeholders.
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4. Essence of corporate governance
OECD [5] notes that CG functions as a structure that protects the confidence of 
investors, advance capital market access and acceptance, and enhance the economic 
development of an organization. By explicitly postulation the operational mode and 
compliance checks for approved activities, the CG system decreases the operational 
cost and advance economic interest. The above makes CG essential, advantageous 
and practical for all forms and sector of an organization (i.e. multinationals, 
state-owned enterprises, domestic organizations, family-owned firms, and small 
businesses).
Notwithstanding the disparity in nations operation of CG with regards to 
the institutional, regulatory and legal environment, they possess a common 
aim; to define the rights, responsibilities and behaviors that are required of an 
organization’s owners (the ‘principals’) and managers (the ‘agents’) for the busi-
ness to operate successfully. Owners’ connotes any person(s) who possess equity 
(i.e. shares) in the organization. Manager encompasses any person mandated to 
oversee the affairs of an organization by the owners’ or board of directors of the 
organization.
When breaches in CG happen, they may be systemic, resulting from the neg-
ligence of duty or actual sabotage by employees. Nonetheless, the presence of a 
systemic failure (i.e. a global economic crisis) usually denotes a misalignment in the 
interest of the owners’ and management; and this, an effective CG structure should 
have addressed before escalation.
5. Scope of corporate governance
OECD [5] posits that CG characteristically addresses procedures to manage, 
control, and decrease non-financial, operational, and financial risks by structuring 
the accountability, integrity, and transparency of an organization’s management 
actors (i.e. board members, managers, employees and shareholders) at varying 
levels within an organization. Key scopes include:
i. Shareholders’ rights: securing and facilitating the right and participation 
of the owner’s in organization meetings, including voting on changes to the 
organization’s structure (i.e. articles of incorporation) and major decisions 
of governance (i.e. membership of the board and members remuneration).
ii. Stakeholders’ rights: recognition of the organization’s impact on broader 
interest groups such as employees, customers and communities.
iii. Financial transparency: disclosure of the organization’s operating and finan-
cial outcomes, the reward system for board members and senior manage-
ment, and all associated information required to appraise organization and 
management performance.
iv. Proper accounting: duty to record all business transactions accurately (to 
avoid fictitious entries and off-the-book accounts), ensure internal sound 
controls (including the safe custody over assets) and employ proper account-
ing principles and techniques (i.e. liabilities, valuing organization, and 
assets). Usually, external accreditation may assist to guarantee the financial 
information validity being presented; via the activity of an independent 
party (i.e. with renowned integrity) assessment of the results.
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v. Information sharing: obligation to present accurate, timely, and reli-
able information to the stakeholders, concerning the activities of the 
organization.
vi. Oversight: the creation of the board and organizational structures (e.g. com-
mittees and chairs) that ensure employees are responsible for and evaluate 
different dimensions of an organization’s accountability and operations.
vii. Review: provision of evaluated output and reports on policy execution and 
effectiveness, the recommendation of changes where necessary.
While various institutional arrangements can be adopted for CG, an organi-
zation’s board of directors is viewed as the framework’s centerpiece; the board 
envisions leadership on tactical, strategic, and significant operational issues and 
is deemed as possessing a duty of care for an organization by setting the tone at 
the top and promoting a CG framework that covers all levels of the organization 
and risks.
6. Principles of corporate governance
OECD [5]; Ngozi and Raymond [8] posits that for CG to effectively function, 
the following principles must be present; transparency, accountability, and integ-
rity of CG.
i. Transparency: ensuring that the benefits package of the board members 
and senior management team are made public; aligned to sustainable 
performance and decided by a non-executive independent director(s). 
Transparency International [20] supports government and institutional 
investors in their call for shareholder approval of the board members and 
senior management team reward packages (i.e. stock options, long-term 
incentives, and pensions). Organizations should publicly report on CG 
structures and anti-corruption systems, including their overall operations 
and performance.
ii. Accountability: Shareholder and stakeholder rights should include holding 
boards, owners and senior management accountable for their actions and 
respect the rights of owners. Minority shareholders rights should be safe 
and their voice encouraged. Effective participation and enacted rights aids 
in help in opposing policy and decisions that favor only the interest of the 
board and senior management teams; hence, discouraging corrupt actions or 
masked abuses.
iii. Integrity: the same CG standards should be applied across all units of an 
organization and in all countries where it operates. Good CG standards, 
rules and ethical principles should not be limited to the parent organization. 
Equally, organizations should be committed to improving CG standards 
in any alliance where they possess influence (e.g. consortia, joint ventures, 
suppliers, and agents). Exact board responsibilities must be apportioned to 
oversee CG as well as ethical and integrity issues. Transparency International 
[20] strongly advocates the establishment of independent remuneration and 
audit committees. Whistle-blowers should be secure, protected and encour-
aged, to avoid retaliation and victimization.
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In supporting these principles of good CG, organizations should be willing to 
enact the key tools required to reduce risk, corruption, and enhance their zero toler-
ance for abusive actions. The optimal establishment, execution and restructuring 
of such a system will guarantee that corruption is neither a tolerable nor legitimate 
business coat.
7. Internal corporate governance controls
Sreeti [19] posits that internal CG monitors and controls activities; and executes 
corrective action to achieve organizational goals. This function includes:
i. Monitoring by the board of directors: directors’ board, has a legal mandate 
and authority to recruit, sack, and reward executive management, secure 
capital invested. A regular meeting of the board ensures that potential issues 
are identified, brain-stormed, and solutions are decided. While non-execu-
tive directors are believed to be much autonomous, it may not result in much 
effective CG practices and may not advance performance. Nonetheless, the 
capacity of the board to supervise the organization’s executives is anchored 
on its ability to access information. Executive directors have advanced 
knowledge of processes in the decision-making process and appraise top 
executive based on the value of their decisions that resulted in the statement 
of outcome for the organizations’ financial and non-financial performance.
ii. Internal control processes and internal auditors: This encompasses policies 
executed by an organization’s directors’ board, the committee for audit, 
management, and employees to provide appropriate assurance of the organi-
zation accomplishing its goals. Internal auditors are employees in an organi-
zation who evaluate the design and execution of the organization’s internal 
control process and the reliability and consistency of its financial reporting.
iii. Power balance: This implementation of power separation is encouraged in 
organizations; where distinct units check and balance one another’s activity. 
One unit may recommend an organization-wide administrative change, the 
other unit could review the recommendation, and another unit may veto the 
recommendation, and yet another may evaluate the securing of interest of 
other stakeholders (i.e. customers, employees, shareholders).
iv. Remuneration: remuneration akin to performance-based is designed to 
correlate reward to employee performance. It could be in the cash form or 
non-cash form (i.e. shares, stock, etc.). These incentive schemes are mostly 
reactive with regards to the logic that it offers no avenue for preventing 
opportunistic conduct and mistakes, and may educe myopic behavior.
8. External corporate governance controls
Sreeti [21] posits that external CG controls involve the exercise of external stake-
holders controls over the affairs of an organization. It includes:
i. Government regulations.
ii. Managerial labour market.
Corporate Governance - Recent Advances and Perspectives
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9. Merit of corporate governance
Palia and Lichtenberg [22]; Black et al. [23], note the followings as benefits 
inherent in the rightful application of CG;
i. Ensures corporate success and economic growth.
ii. Maintains investors’ confidence.
iii. Establishes a positive impact on the share price.
iv. Effectively minimizes wastages, corruption, risks and mismanagement.
Gompers et al. [24] maintain that good CG increases valuations and boost the 
profitability of the organization. Claessen et al. [25] note that better organizations 
frameworks benefit organizations through greater access to financing, lower cost 
of capital, better performance and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders. 
Donaldson [26] posits that good CG is important for increasing investor confidence 
and market liquidity. Frost et al. [27] state that improvements in CG practices 
ensure better disclosures in business reporting.
10. Stewardship theory perspective to corporate governance
The etymology of the stewardship theory is anchored in the field of psychology 
and sociology and its connotation according to Davis et al. [28] posits the protection 
and maximization of shareholders wealth via organization performance; this opti-
mizes the steward’s utility functions. In this analogy, stewards are organizations’ 
management working for the interest of the shareholders. They secure and enhance 
profits for shareholders. Unlike the agency theory, the stewardship theory does 
not emphasize the view of individualism [29], but instead on the function of top 
executives as stewards, amalgamating their interest and goals with the organization. 
The stewardship view advocates that stewards are motivated and satisfied when 
organizational goals are attained.
Agyris [30] posits that the agency theory looks at an employee or people as an 
economic being, which suppresses an individual’s ambitions. However, stewardship 
theory views the relevance of structures that equips the steward and offers optimal 
autonomy anchored on trust [29]. It emphasis the stature of employees or manage-
ment to function autonomously, so that returns are maximized for the shareholders’. 
Hence, minimizing the costs focused on controlling and monitoring behaviors [28]. 
The stewardship concept suggests that a successful organization (not individual 
success) leads to happiness and hence motivate stewards [31].
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Alternatively, Daly et al. [32] argue that to protect their reputations as decision-
makers in organizations, management and directors need to optimally lead the 
organization to optimize non-financial and financial performance. Hence, Fama 
[33] posits that management and directors are likewise managing their jobs to be 
perceived as effective and result-oriented stewards of their organization, while, 
Shleifer and Vishny [34] insist that management return revenue to investors to 
foster a good reputation so they can re-enter the market for future finance. Peggy 
and Hugh [35] argue that unlike agency theory, stewardship theory helps in aligning 
the goals of managers and shareholders. When managers and shareholders’ goals are 
aligned, organization performance is expected to increase as there is no conflict of 
self-interest (Figure 1).
11. Conclusion and prospect of corporate governance
An organizations’ operations has impact that transcends the physical boundar-
ies of their functioning, with influence on diverse issues of their environment 
(i.e. political, economic, legal, socio-cultural, etc.) which makes the role of their 
governance structural practices much strategic, and reinforces the need for sustain-
ability. Today’s CG structure and practice are constantly been scrutinized by diverse 
stakeholders as the easy resort to ethical, speedy, and sustainable enforcement of 
responsible corporate practices; this is necessitated by the negligence and slow pace 
of enacting legislative reform on such issues. Hence, CG when utilized as a tool 
possesses the capability to advance sustainable initiatives and engagement.
In prospecting it potency, the harnessing of this tool (i.e. corporate governance) 
demands a clear understanding of its potentials (i.e. concept of corporate gover-
nance, essence of corporate governance, scope of corporate governance, principles 
of corporate governance, internal corporate governance controls, external corpo-
rate governance controls, merit of corporate governance, and stewardship theory 
perspective to corporate governance, etc.). A key factor in this harnessing is the 
activity of stakeholders; corporation accountability must transcend beyond their 
shareholder to incorporate the stakeholders, and an effective framework should be 
streamlined to optimize the interactions of such engagement. Also, the GC actors of 
tomorrow must understand and have an experimental knowledge of their environ-
ment and the core of sustainability (i.e. today’s action in exploring opportunity 
must not hinder the future availability and exploration of opportunities).
CG impacts the optimality of performance at the organizational and national 
level. Having explored the labyrinth of CG with a focus on the concept of CG, the 
essence of CG, the scope of CG, principles of CG, internal CG controls, external 
CG controls, the merit of CG, and stewardship theory perspective to CG, it is the 
author’s opinion that CG plays a quintessential role in furthering the posterity and 
Figure 1. 
The stewardship model. Source: [31].
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optimal sustainability of an organization’s objectives as well as a nations’ relevance 
at the global scene. Nonetheless, there is a need for optimizing the execution of 
CG practices via optimizing the flow of information, benchmarking best practices 
and standards, sustained commitment of all relevant stakeholders, and rewarding 
incentives to practitioners of CG practices.
The future of CG lies in their relevance today, and their ability to adapt to 
changing times as well as cover legal loopholes that undermine their potency. The 
practicality of that relevance for CG practices is strengthened in the involvement 
of relevant stakeholders in the formulation, enactment, and execution of such 
practices. Although the structuring, operating and controlling of an organization 
or nations’ interest is not possible without the involvement of CG practices, CG 
practices can not be viable without the participation of relevant key stakehold-
ers. The value of CG practices in today’s organizations will continue to evolve as 
organizations are becoming agents of social re-engineers and not just economic 
transformers.
Conflict of interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
© 2021 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
9
Corporate Governance: The Sustainability Quest
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.99306
References
[1] Abu-Tapanjeh MA. Corporate 
governance from Islamic perspective: A 
corporative analysis with OECD. Journal 
of General Management. 2008; 
33(4), 24-57.
[2] Cadbury A. Report on the Committee 
on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 





[3] Obodo C. Globalization and 
governance challenges in Nigeria: A 
regulatory and institutional perspective. 
African Journals of Social Sciences. 
2014; 4(2), 50-64.
[4] Porta R. Investors protection and 
corporate governance. Journal of 
Financial Economics. 2000; 58(5),  
3-27.
[5] OECD. Principles on corporate 
governance principles of corporate 
governance. 2004. Available from 
http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf
[6] Farrar J. Company law 3rd ed. 
Butterworths Press; 1998. Pp. 301.
[7] Well H. The birth of corporate 
governance. Seattle Review. 2010; 
33, 35-42.
[8] Ngozi I, Raymond A. An appraisal 
of corporate governance issues in 
enhancing transparency and 
accountability in small and medium 
enterprises (SME). International 
Journal of Academic Research in 
Business and Social Sciences. 2013;  
3(8), 162-176.
[9] Spanos LJ. Corporate governance in 
Greece: Developments and policy 
implcations. Journal of Corporate 
Governance. 2005; 5(1), 15-30.
[10] Rezaee Z. Corporate Governance 
and Ethics. John Wiley and Sons, Inc, 
USA; 2009.
[11] Okike E. Corporate governance in 
Nigeria: The status quo’. An International 
Review. 2007; 15(2), 173-193.
[12] Fatimoh M. Impact of corporate 
governance on banking sector 
performance in Nigeria. International 
journal of economic development 
research and Investment. 2011; 
2(2), 52-59.
[13] Adeoye A, Amupitan M. Corporate 
governance in the Nigerian banking 
sector: Issues and challenges. European 
Journal of Accounting Auditing and 
Finance Research. 2015; 3(5), 64-89.
[14] Oyebode A. The Imperative of 





[15] Sanusi LS. Banking Reforms and its 
Impact on the Nigerian Economy. 2012. 
Available from www.bis.org/review/
r120320d.pdf
[16] Uwuigbe OR. Corporate 
Governance and Financial Performance 
of Banks: A Study of Listed Banks in 
Nigeria [Thesis]. Covenant 
University; 2011.
[17] Baumeister R. F, Leary, M. R. 
Writing narrative literature reviews. 
Review of General Psychology, 1997; 
1(3), 311-320.
[18] Ferrari, R. Writing narrative style 
literature reviews. The European 
Medical Writers Association, 2015; 
25(4), 230-235.
[19] Cochran P, Wartick S. Corporate 
Governance: A Review of the Literature. 
Corporate Governance - Recent Advances and Perspectives
10
Financial Executives Research 
Foundation, Morristown, New 
Jersey; 1988.
[20] Transparency International. 2015. 
Available from: https://www.
transparency.org
[21] Sreeti R. Corporate Governance 
– Concepts and Issues. Institute of 
Directors, India; 2012. 1-13.
[22] Palia D, Lichtenberg, F. Managerial 
ownership and firm performance: A 
re-examination using productivity 
measurement. Journal of Corporate 
Finance. 1999; 5(4), 323-339.
[23] Black B, Jang H, Kim W. Does 
Corporate Government Affect Firm 
Value? Working Paper 327, Stanford Law 
School; 2003.
[24] Gompers PA, Ishii JL, Metrick A. 
Corporate governance and equity prices. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2003; 
118(1), 107-155.
[25] Claessens S, Djankov S, Fan J. 
Disentangling the incentive and 
entrenchment effects of large 
shareholders. The Journal of Finance. 
2002; 57(6), 2741-2771.
[26] Donaldson W. Congressional 
Testimony Concerning the 
Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxly 
Act of 2002. 2003.Available from www.
sec.gov/news/testimony/090903/tswhd
[27] Frost CA, Gordon EA, Hayes, AF. 
Stock exchange disclosure and market 
liquidity: An analysis of 50 international 
exchanges. Kuala Lumpur, Paper 
Presented at the World Federation of 
Exchanges Forum on Managing 
Exchanges in Emerging 
Economics. 2002.
[28] Davis J, Schoorman F, Donaldson L. 
Toward a stewardship theory of 
management. Academy of Management 
Review. 1997; 22, 20-47.
[29] Donaldson L, Davis J. Stewardship 
theory or agency theory: CEO 
governance and shareholder returns. 
Academy Of Management Review. 1991; 
20(1), 65.
[30] Agyris C. Some limits of rational 
man organisation theory. Public 
Administration Review. 1973; 33, 
253-267.
[31] Abdallah H, Valentine B. 
Fundamentals and ethics theories of 
corporate governance. Middle Eastern 
Finance and Economics. 2009; 4, 88-96.
[32] Daily M, Dalton R, Cannella A. 
Corporate governance: Decades of 
dialogue and data. Academy of 
Management Review. 2003; 
28(3), 71-82.
[33] Fama E. Agency problems and the 
theory of the firm. Journal of Political 
Economy. 1980; 88, 288-307.
[34] Shleifer A, Vishny R. A survey of 
corporate governance. Journal of 
Finance. 1997; LII, 737-783.
[35] Peggy ML, Hugh MO. Ownership 
structures and R and D investments of 
US and Japanese firms: Agency and 
stewardship perspectives. Academy of 
Management Journal. 2001; 46(2), 
212-225.
